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1. Introduction 
In [13] Moschovakis presents a topological model, over Baire space, for a 
system of intuitionistic analysis that includes relativized dependent choice, 
monotone bar induction (verified in [2, pp. 13-14]), Kripke’s schema, and the 
restriction of Brouwer’s principle for numbers to predicates without free 
choice-sequence parameters. Following Krol [12], one may describe this model 
roughly1 as follows. Let 4-0) be the complete Heyting algebra of open subsets 
of Oo. Choice sequences are given in the model by functions 5 : w x o --, C7( wo), 
where 
U E(m, n) = mm and E(m, n) n E(m, p) = 0 (I) 
n 
for all m, n, p with IZ fp (in what follows I, m, n, p, . . . will be natural numbers). 
If one introduces a constant 8 for every such E : w x o + 0( Oo), one may assign 
truth values to atomic statements as follows: 
,,,=+=[;;9 ;::;I; 
(II) 
II&r) = hII = E(m, n) 
(ti is the numeral denoting the natural number m). More complex sentences 
receive truth values in 0( wo) by the usual inductive definition: 
!lA & BII = IIAII n 11~11~ IIA U BII = IIAII U IPII, 
II1AIl = intYo - IIAII), JIA -+ B = int(( - IlAID 
IW B(x)ll int fl IIB(fi)ll, Il3xB(x)ll $J IIB@)ll, (III) 
IlV~B(4ll int fJ lWB(4II = 
The true sentences are with truth Ow. 
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Unfortunately, the unrestricted version of Brouwer’s principle for numbers fails 
in the model. This failure prevents the model from being a completely reliable 
guide to intuitionistic mathematics: one may show, for example, that 
although intuitionistically correct for the real numbers, is not true in the model. 
While it still remains very useful in the study of intuitionism, a model of the 
unrestricted form of Brouwer’s principle would, of course, be desirable. 
This last example is a real-algebraic instance of a theorem by Krol [9], who 
shows that if one replaces mm by any T,-space T and builds a Moschovakis-type 
model over T, the unrestricted version of Brouwer’s principle fails as long as 
113~ <&x> = O)ll = T - {t> 
for some E and some f E T. So to obtain a model for the unrestricted version of 
Brouwer’s principle, one must either shrink the universe of choice sequences--so 
that no available 5 is connected to a single t E T as above--or get rid of the points 
t, and build models over complete Heyting algebras that are not algebras of open 
subsets of a T,-space. Krol eventually followed the first alternative, and found a 
submodel of Moschovakis’ model’ that verified Brouwer’s principle [12] and lent 
itself to further metamathematical investigations [10, 111. 
One may, however, follow the second alternative to obtain a model for 
Brouwer’s principle. To get rid of the points of “w, one should change the 
algebra of truth values by identifying wo with Ow - {p} for all p E Oo. Starting 
from a ‘sober topological space’ [6, p. 3351, Fourman and Scott make such 
identifications to produce a complete Heyting algebra with ‘no points’ [6, p. 3371. 
If one starts with a space X that is Tl as well as sober, the cHa S(X) produced by 
Fourman and Scott is the cHa of coperfect open subsets of X: i.e., open subsets 
of X whose complements are perfect closed subsets of X. Given S(Oo), one may 
follow Moschovakis’s procedure to define a structure for the language of [B] 
supplemented by choice-sequence constants. Choice sequences are represented 
by maps E : w x CO + S( OOJ) such that 
V @m, n) = Oo and Qm, n) A 5(m, p) = fl (I)’ n 
for all m, IZ, p with it #p (here and below, A, V, A, v and $ will stand for the 
cHa operations of S(Oo)). Atomic sentences receive truth values just as before, 
and the inductive definition of l(All for logically complex A simply replaces the 
*The truth-value algebra of Krol’s model is actually 0((“2), but one could replace “‘w by “2 in the 
definition of Moschovakis’s model without changing anything in the present discussion. 
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cHa operations of 4”~) by those of S(Oo): 
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Say that 
IV & BII = IIAII A 11~11, IIA ” 41 = IIAII v IPII, 
IPAll = IIAII +fl, IV--+ BII = IIAII 3 11~11~ 
IW %)ll = 0 lIN~)ll, IW Nx)ll = y IIWfi)lL 
(III)’ 
IIVa W4ll = Q llw9ll~ Il~aW4ll = y ll~(~Nl. 
A holds in the model just in case IlAll = oco. The unrestricted form of 
Brouwer’s principle for numbers, relativized dependent choice, monotone bar 
induction, and Kripke’s schema all hold in this model, and from these principles 
other interesting ones follow: for example, the uniformity principle [l] and certain 
topologically restricted forms of Brouwer’s principle for functions [19,20]. Although 
these statements also hold in Krol’s model, I have found the present model much 
easier to understand and to manipulate. 
Section. 1 presents the formal theory to be verified in the model, as well as 
some of its consequences. Section 2 describes the model in more detail, and 
states a basic result on the evaluation of terms and functors. Section 3 proves 
useful lemmas concerning the cHa S(Oo) and the calculation of truth values. And 
Sections 4 and 5 show that the theory of Section 1 holds in the model. The 
Conclusion, finally, raises questions about possible applications of the model. 
The notations regarding the formal theory of Section 1 come from [8], which the 
reader should have close at hand. Any non-standard notations or notions will be 
explained when introduced. 
1. The theory 
The theory Y to be studied below is written essentially in the language of [8, 
Sections 3-51, although Section 2 below adds choice-sequence constants and 
makes a few minor changes. Thus there are two sorts of variables-x, y, z, . . . 
ranging over natural numbers, and a, p, y, . . . ranging over choice sequences- 
and there are symbols for zero and for certain primitive-recursive functions (see 
[8, 4.2-4.3, 5.51). Y starts, as does the theory of [8], with the two-sorted 
intuitionistic predicate calculus [8, p. 131, with axioms for Heyting arithmetic [8, 
p. 141, with recursion equations for all the primitive-recursive functions used in 
the theory [8, 5.51, and with certain ‘postulates concerning functions’ [8, p. 141. 
To these basic axioms Y adds four axiom schemata. Relativized dependent choice 
(RDC) consists of formulae 
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Monotone bar induction (BI,) consists of formulae 
Vx(R(x)+VyR(x*2y+‘))&V~3xR(&(x))&Vx(R(x)+A(x)) 
& Vx [VyA(x *2Y+‘)-*A(x)]-*A(1). 
The weak continuity principle for numbers (WC-N) consists of formulae 
Va 3xA(a; x)+ Va 3x, y V/3 [&i(y) = p(y)+A(/% x)]. 
And Kripke’s schema (KS) consists of formulae 
3a: [3x ((u(x) # 0) -A], 
where A does not contain LY free. All of the formulae displayed may contain free 
choice-sequence parameters. 
The basic axioms, together with RDC, BIM, and WC-N, imply Brouwer’s 
principle for numbers [7, p. 3481: 
Va3xA(cu,x)+%ontinuous F:Wo+oVacA(a, F(a)). 
Because one may represent continuous functionals in (mU)o by elements of mu [8, 
pp. 70-711, one may write Brouwer’s principle as a schema in the language of F. 
Although one may also use elements of Oc_r to represent continuous functions in 
(‘“)“)(wo) [8, pp. 72-31, Myhill [14] has shown that KS contradicts 
VW $lA(a, /3)+ 3continuous F: wo+ w~VaA(a, F(a)), 
Brouwer’s principle for functions. Yet .5F - {KS} does imply statements 
Va3BA(a, B) & ( ) * + 3 continuous F: oo+ Ow VaA(a; F(a)), 
where (*) restricts the topological complexity of {(a; /I) E ( mu)2 :A( a, /3)}; (*) 
may demand that { (LY, #I) E ( mm)2 :A(@, /3)} be a continuous image of @w [19, p. 
591, or that {/I E Ow : A(cY, /3)} be closed for every (Y E wo [20, p. 851. 
If (Y is a choice sequence, {x : 3y ((~(2~3”) # 0)) is a species of natural numbers. 
KS and RDC imply that any definable species {x : A(x)} of natural numbers has 
the form just given [l, p. 2381. One may thus interpret second-order Heyting 
arithmetic in 5, and on the basis of this interpretation WC-N implies the 
principle of uniformity: 
VX ayA(X, y)+$ VXA(X, Y) 
([l, p. 2401; X is a variable ranging over species of natural numbers). 
2. The model 
To describe the cHa of truth values for the model, one starts with the cHa 
C?(“w) of open substs of Oo. Let 
S( Oo) = {U E S( Oo) : wo - U is a perfect set}. 
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By [6, pp. 326, 3371, the map F : S( Ow)+ S( “w) given for U E Q( Oo) by 
F(U) = complement of perfect kernel of -0 - U 
is a cHa-morphism [6, p. 3181. A, V, A, v, and + will be used for the cHa 
operations in Q”w), while G will be used for the natural partial ordering on 
S(wo) (although G is E 1 (S(wo) X S(“w))). 
A choice sequence, in the model, is a function 5 : o x o+ S(Ow) such that 
V c(r, m) = Ow and 5(1, m) A Q1, n) = 0 
m 
for all 1, m, n with m #n. Add, to the formal language of Section 1, a 
choice-sequence constant $ for every choice sequence E. Each closed term t or 
closed functor u in this expanded language receives an interpretation t^: w -+ 
S(“‘o) or li : w x w+= S(“o)); i(n) is to be the truth value of t = iz, while ii(m, n) 
is to be the truth value of u(k) = iz. Certain functions defined explicitly in terms 
of others-the relevant symbols are min, max, Ix - y], (a),, lb(a), a *b, L%(x) [8, 
5.5]-will be regarded as abbreviations, and so need not be treated directly in what 
follows. Also, certain functions that take both numerical and choice-sequence 
arguments-the relevant symbols are Cy<r a(y), II,,,, a(y), minyGr a(y), 
maxYGz a(y) 18, 5.51- are most conveniently handled in the model as operators 
producing one choice sequence from another. One thus alters the definition of 
functor in [8, p. lo] so that (C u), (II u), (min u), and (max U) are functors 
whenever u is a functor, and one makes typographical changes in the axioms 
governing finite sums, products, minima, and maxima. So “Bla, “B2a [8, p. 281 
become 
“B3a. “B4a become 
( > l--l a (0) = 1, (n(Y)(zI)=(~LY)(Z).01(z); 
*Hl, *H2 [8, p. 311 become 
(min a)(O) = (Y(O), (min a)(~‘) = min((min w)(z), a(~‘)); 
and *H3, *H4 become 
With 
4751: 
(0 
(ii) 
(ma d(O) = GO, (max (Y)(z’) = max((max (u)(z), (I). 
these changes in mind, one may define I and fi inductively as in [ll, p. 
O(0) = Oo, O(n + 1) = 0; 
(t1 + t&n) = v GI) A M&); n,+?l*=n 
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(iii) t’, tl - &, t:‘, t!, pd(t), Cl z t2, q(t), sg(t), rm(tI, f2), [fl/f2], and pt are 
handled much as tI + f2 is; 
(iv) (hr. f(x))“(m, n) = f(x/rh)*(n); 
(9 t = 5; 
(vi) [(u)(f)lIn) = V f(m) A f%, n); m 
(vii) (x u)~(O, 0) = Ow, (2 U) *(O, II + 1) = 0, 
(viii) II u is handled much as C u is; 
(ix) (min u)-(0, n) = fi(0, n), 
(min u)^(m + 1, n) = mincyI)=n (min ~)~(m, k) A fi(m + 1,Z); 
(x) max u is handled much as min u is. 
Arbitrary sentences A in the expanded language receive truth values IlAll E 
S(“o) as follows (again, the definition is analogous to that in [ll, p. 4761): 
IIt1 = f2ll = y h(m) A 72(m), 
IIA & Bll = IIAII A IlBll, IIA v BII = IIAII v 11~11, 
IWII = IIAII Jf% IIA+ Bll = IIAII + 11~11, 
IIVX %)ll = () IIWfi)ll, IW W)ll = y IIW~)ll, 
IIVaW4ll = 0 IlNm lWN4ll = y llmll. 
A sentence A is true in the model just in case I(AJI = ow. 
To verify certain principles in the model, one must prove the following 
analogue of Lemma 1 in [13, p. 2641: 
Lemma 1. (a) Zf f is a closed term, then Vk I(k) = OCII and Z(m) A I(n) = 0 if 
m #n. 
(b) Zf u is a closed fincfor, then ii is a choice sequence. 
(c) Zf fI, f2 are closed terms and fl(f2/k) is the result of substituting k for certain 
specified occurrences of t2 in fI, then 
II(m) = v l,(k) A [fl(f2/k)lA(m) for all m. 
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(d) Zf u is a closed functor, t is a closed term, and u(t/h) is the result of 
substituting k for certain specified occurrences oft in u, then 
u(m, n) = v f(k) /r [u(t/k)]*(m, n) for all m, n. 
(e) Zf A is a sentence, t is a closed term, and A(t/h) is the result of substituting k 
for certain specified occurrences of t in A, then 
IlAll = y W) A IIAW~N 
(f) Zf t is a closed term, u is a closed functor, and t(u/d) is the result of 
substituting h for certain specified occurrences of u in t, then [t(~/l?)]~= ?. 
(g) Zf u, v are closed functors and u(v/6) is the result of substituting d for 
certain specified occurrences of v in u, then [u(v/ 6)] * = fi. 
(h) Zf A is a sentence, u is a closed functor, and A(u/b) is the result of 
substituting 6 for certain specified occurrences of u in A, then ]]A(u/L?)]] = ]]A]]. 
Parts (a) and (b), (c) and (d), and (f) and (g) are proved by simultaneous 
inductions on the complexity of the terms or functors involved; given (a)-(d) and 
(f)-(g), one proves (e) and (h) by induction on the logical complexity of A. 
Although one must use an appropriate measure of complexity for terms and 
functors, the proofs present no real difficulties and will be omitted. 
3. Preliminary results on the model 
To show that the theory of Section 1 is true in the model of Section 2, one must 
exploit certain facts to be proved in this section. The first result finds a substitute 
for the points eliminated by F of Section 2. In what follows a tree will be a 
function T : (J E ‘“2 I+ to cc0 w such that 
(i) if u c r, then t, c t, 
(ii) if CT and r are incomparable, then to and tv are incomparable 
for all a, r E ‘“2; T, T’, . . . will be trees. [T] is the set of all points in mm having 
arbitrarily long finite initial segments in ran T; [T] is always a perfect closed set. 
Let 
for u E <o~. If U E C7( Ow), U contains a tree T just in case B, c U, while T 
belongs to U-T E U-just in case [T] f~ U f 0. Given these definitions, one may 
state 
Lemma 2. Zf U, V E O(“o), then 
F(U) =z F(V) iff VT (T E U-* T E V). 
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Proof. The definition of ‘belongs to’ implies that 
V~(~~~~~~V) iff V~(~~~nV=0~~~~n~=0). 
Because every [T] is a perfect closed set, the definition of F implies that 
(*) 
v~{~~~nv=0~~~~n~=0) 
iff VT([T]nF(V)=0~[T1nF(u)=0). 
One clearly can infer the right-hand side of (*) from 
vp E “@J (p $ W?+p $ F(W). 
But the right-hand side of (*) also implies this condition: because W. - F(V) is a 
perfect closed set, one may easily show that any p E @w - F(V) belongs to [T} for 
some T with [T) fl F(V) = 0. Thus 
VT (T E U+ T E V) iff Vp E *o (p $ F(V)+p $ F(U)) 
iff F(U) c_ F(V) 
iff F(U) G F(V). 0 
The remaining results of this section concern the truth values of quantified 
statements. First, existential quantifiers: 
Lemma 3. B, s IlSxA(x)ll iff B, - U,, \lA(ri)ll is at most countable; an analogous 
result holds for exktential choice-sequence quantifiers. 
Proof. Note, first of all, that 
ll~xA(~)ll = y IIA(~)ll = “(v ILWII) 
= Oco - (perfect kernel of wo - &J llA(ri)ll) . 
If B,G IlElxA(x)ll, then B, -U, IIA(ri)ll is contained in the closed set 
Ow - IJ, IIA(ri)ll but disjoint from its perfect kernel. So by the Cantor- 
Bendixson theorem, B, - U, IIA(li)ll is at most countable. 
Conversely, if B, -U, IIA(li)ll is at most countable, its perfect kernel 
vanishes; but since B, is open in Oo, this perfect kernel is the intersection of B, 
with the perfect kernel of Ow - U, IIA(li)ll. Thus 
B ~ c Ow - (perfect kernel of Ow -y IIA(ri)ll) = (13xA(x)ll 
and so B, s Il3xA(x)ll. Cl 
Lemmas 2 and 3 combine to yield 
Lemma 4. T E 113xA(x)ll ifl T E IIA(ri)ll f or some n; an analogous result hoi& for 
existential choice-sequence quantifiers. 
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Proof. Lemma 2 yields the implication from right to left, since every ]]A(ri)]] G 
IWA(x 
If T E Il3xA(x)]l, then because Il3xA(x)]l is an open set, B,< ]13xA(x)ll for 
some o E ‘“2. Lemma 3 says that B, - U,, ]]A(ti)l] is at most countable, but since 
T is a tree, B, n [T] is uncountable. [T] therefore has nonempty intersection with 
some IjA(ri 0 
For universal quantifiers, one may state 
Lemma 5. IjVx B(x)]] = int n,, I]B(ri)ll, and an mudogous 
universal choice-sequence quantifiers. 
Proof. U = int n,, I]B(it)]] is the largest open set contained in 
IWB(x)ll = /in IlB@)ll is also an open subset of n, IIB(ri)]l, 
IW BWII G int rl IIWW n 
result holds for 
n,, ]]B(ri)]]. Since 
On the other hand, since U is a subset of every IIB(ri)ll, F(U) is a subset of every 
WB(~)ll) = IIWNI, and so F(U) E lJ by the argument above. Because U G 
F(U) by the definition of F, U = F(U) and 
int fJll WNl= F(U) s () IIB(fi)ll = IW B(x)ll. 
Thus JlVx B(x)]1 = int n,, IIB(ri)l]. 0 
Finally, one has 
Lemma 6. Zf T $ IlVx B(x)/], then for every t, there is a T’, with tC, = t,, and un n 
such that T’ 4 IIB(ri)]]; an analogous result holds for universal choice-sequence 
quantifiers. 
Proof. By Lemma 5, 
[T] n int n IIB(ri)ll = [T] n IIVX B(x)11 = 0. 
n 
For every p E [T] f~ B,, therefore, there is a p’ E B,-n,, IlB(ri)]]: i.e., p’ E 
B, - IIB(ti)ll for some n. Since B, - IlB(ri)ll is a perfect closed set, B, contains a 
tree T’ with p’ E [T’] G urn - I]B(ri)ll, and one easily obtains the result desired. 
4. Verification of 3 - {RDC, BIm, WC-N, KS} in the model 
The next two sections will show that every closed instance, in the expanded 
language, of an axiom of 5 is true in the model, and that the rules of inference 
preserve truth: that is, if AI, . . . , A,/B is an application of a rule of inference, 
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and every closed instance of each Ai holds in the model, then every closed 
instance of B holds in the model. The present section will concentrate on the 
basic arithmetical axioms and rules of inference, and where possible I will use the 
names of [8] to refer to these axioms and rules. Once the axioms and rules of the 
two-sorted intuitionistic predicate calculus are verified, one can show that every 
closed instance of an axiom is true by showing that the universal closure of the 
axiom is true; this fact will be exploited without fanfare in what follows. 
1-7, g’, 9N, 9F, 12N, and 12F are true in the model, or preserve truth in the 
model, because S(Ow) is a cHa. 
One must invoke Lemma 1 to prove that 10N and 10F are true in the model. If 
c is a closed term, then 
IW4~)--+40ll= (A ILWII) + II-WII n 
by the definitions, and so 
IWN~)+4Qll = (A IIAWII) 3 V @> A IlN~)ll n m 
by Lemma l(e). By Lemma l(a) 
0 IIA(fi>ll = ($ ILWII) A y f(m), 
and so by the distributive law 
$ IIA(~)ll = y ($ IIAWII) A f(m) 
s y f(m) A IIA(~>ll. 
so 
ow = (A IL-WII) + V f(m) A II4~N n m 
and 1ON is true in the model. If u is a closed functor, then 
IlV~44+A(u)ll= (+ IIA(t)ll) + IIA(u)ll 
by the definitions, and so by Lemma l(h) 
IlV~44+A(u)ll = (0 ll4tIll) 3 llA(@ll = “‘0. 
Thus 1OF is also true in the model. 
11N and 11F fall victim to similar arguments. If t is a closed term, then the 
definitions and Lemma l(e) imply that 
II-W+ 3xA(x)ll = IIAWII + v IIA@)ll = (v f(m) A IIA(Wl) ‘y IIA(fi)ll 
= A [f(m) ~nllA~~~ll &ia@~ll] m n 
= -co. 
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So 11N holds in the model. If u is a closed functor, 
Lemma l(h) imply that 
M(u)+ gaA(a)ll = IMu)ll + y ll48ll 
= lM@ll 3 y llAC% 
= ow. 
So 11F also holds in the model. 
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then the definitions and 
With the help of an external argument by induction one proves that 13, the 
axiom schema of induction, holds in the model: see, for example, [12, p. 4311. 
An easy argument shows that for all M and 12, 
This result easily implies the truth, in the model, of any sentence obtained by 
replacing variables by numerals in one of the remaining Peano axioms (14-17) or 
in the recursion equations for any number-theoretic function except pi (18-21 and 
k.1, ‘m.2, where m is 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, or 13). So by the definition of truth 
for numerically quantified statements, the universal closures of the axioms just 
mentioned are true in the model. 
If t is a closed term, then Lemma l(c) implies that for all n, 
= i/ I(m) A [hr(x)la(m, n) 
= {ALr(x)}(t)A(n). 
Because V,, [r(t)]-(n) = “‘0 by Lemma l(a), “0.1 is true in the model. 
An easy argument shows that every instance 
~=fi+$(~j=$-j~j 
of “1.1 holds in the model: for if llriz =rill #O, m =n and II&(ti) = &ri)ll = 
Vk &riz)l(k) = Oo. Thus the universal closure of “1.1 holds in the model. 
Because “2.1 is an easy consequence of RDC, which will be verified in the 
model shortly, “2.1 will not be verified separately. 
To demonstrate the truth, in the model, of the universal closures of the axioms 
governing C a; one need show only that all sentences 
and (z+‘)=(c+r)+s(ti) 
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hold in the model. By the definitions and the results from four paragraphs back, 
A similar argument shows that for all m and a, 
Since Vn (C $)@I’)~+) = %I by Lemma l(a), 
is true in the model. The axioms governing l-I (Y, min cr, and max a! fall victim to 
similar arguments. 
One may easily show that for all m and II, 
IIz-%l==ll =[;y9 
if n is the mth prime, 
otherwise 
(2 is the 0th prime). The recursion equations “18.1, “18.2 for pi will therefore hold 
in the model if 
]]n = @bcti!+Z[m <b & Pr(b)]]l = mu 
whenever m <II are successive primes (see [8, pp. 31-41 for explanation of the 
notation). But the addition and factorial functions, the less-than relation, and 
the set of primes are numeralwise represented, in the theory already verified, by 
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certain obvious formulae, and this theory also proves that the bounded 
least-number operator behaves as it should (see *E5-*E7 in [8, p. 301). This 
theory therefore proves 
ri = ,u!~~<~!+JljZ cb & f+(b)] 
whenever m < n are successive primes. Because every consequence of the theory 
must hold in the model, “18.1 and “18.2 hold in it. 
5. Verification of RDC, BIm, WC-N, and KS in the model 
This section will show that T’s remaining axioms hold in the model. The results 
of Section 4 allow one to exploit [8, 04-51, which gives many formal conse- 
quences of “2.1 together with the axioms and rules already verified. Because the 
formal theorems used below do not depend on “2.1 (see Remark 5.4 of [8, p. 
41]), the results of Section 4 show that these theorems hold in the model. 
The verification of RDC requires the following lemma. 
Lemma 7. ZfBa s Il3cxB(cu)lj, then B, s IjA(g for Some choice sequence f. 
Proof. Lemma 3 implies that if 
u = B, n $J llA(bl, 
then B, - U is at most countable. One may write 
u=U&, id 
where the 0,‘s are pairwise incomparable in <Oo and each B, E llA(&) II for 
some choice sequence Zji* For any k, I let 
(“w - B,) v yI (B, A &(k, O)), if 1~ 0, 
W, 1) = 
y (Bq A Ei(k, I)), if I# 0. 
For any k 
)’ E(k, 0 = Cm@ - Bo) V i\r: (Bq A 5i(k, 0)) V ,yl yt (Bq * &(k, 1)) 
= (“w - Bo) V yI y (Bq * Ei(k 0) 
= Coo - Bm) V y, Bq A \/ Ei(k, I); 
158 P. scowcroff 
since the 5i’s are choice sequences, one obtains 
v 5@, 0 = (wm - &) v v B,; 
I id 
and because lJisl B, = U and B, - lJ is at most countable, Vie1 B, = B, and 
\/ E(k, I) = (“w - B,) v B, = Ow. 
If 1 fm, then 1 or m is not zero, and so 
E(k 0 A 5(k m) = (v B, A Ei(k, 0) A (\(I B, A Ej(k m)) rel 
= j&B, A Ei(k, I) A BOj A gj(k m); 
since the Ui’s are pairwise incomparable, 
E(k I) A g(k m) = 1 B, A &(k, I) A Ei(k, m>; 
and since the Ei’S are choice sequences, and I # m, 
E(k 1) A 5(k m) = 0. 
Thus g is a choice sequence. 
An easy computation based on the definition of 5 shows that B, d II& = $11 for 
every i E Z, and so 
B, s llA(&)ll A Ilk = Eli = llA($) & & = $11. 
But given the axioms and rules already verified in the model, one may apply 
Lemma 4.2 of [8, p. 161, together with the deduction theorem, to show that each 
sentence 
A(ti) & 5;. = $+A($) 
holds in the model. Thus 
&is ll(AGi)ll 
for every i E Z, and 
& = y1 B, s llA(&l 
as desired. Cl 
To show that RDC holds in the model, one must show that 
IIV~ [A(++ 38 MB) & Wcu, B))l &A@ll 
=s Ilsr [(r>o = 6 cfi Vx [A((yM & B((yL (rL,)llll 
for all choice sequences 5. Since every element of S(Ow) is a join of B,‘s, one 
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need show only that every B, less than or equal to the left-hand side is less than 
or equal to the right-hand side. If one can obtain a sequence &, = E, Zjr, f2, . . . of 
choice sequences uch that 
for all i, 
Bm s llA(&) & B(&, h+dll 
one may solve the problem by letting 
&0(2’3’, k, = 5i(j, k, 
for all 1 not of the form 2’3’; an easy argument exploiting the axioms and rules 
already verified will show that 
& s ll<km;>o = t & v.r P(&M & ~(&A, <kow>x~)1ll. 
Yet B, s llA($)ll by hypothesis; and if B, d llA(gi)ll, then 
B, s IIA(&)ll A IlVa [A(a)+ 38 (A(B) &B(a, 8))lll 
s 1138 (A(B) & B(k, B)>ll, 
and Lemma 7 provides a choice sequence Ei+r such that 
B, s IlACk) & B(Ei, h+dll- 
An external application of dependent choice thus finishes the proof. 
The verification of BIM is indirect. Let 
u = 1IVX (R(x)-+Vy R(x *2y+l)) & vo! 3X R(h(x)) 
& VX (R(x)-A(x)) & Vx [V~A(X*~~+‘)+A(X)]II 
and suppose that U # llA(l)ll. L emma 2 provides a tree T, contained in U, that 
does not belong to llA( 1) 11. The argument below will provide collections 
{T”}aecoz of trees, and {n 0 ,+“* of finite sequences of natural numbers, with the } 
following properties: 
(1) tg^’ = t?i); 
(2) ?l, C n,.-i; 
(3) lh n, = lh a; 
(4) T”4 II4hJ)II (W’ is th e numeral of the Godel number for n,); 
(5) T0 = T. 
Given such collections, one may define a tree T” by the condition 
tg = t;. 
One may also define a choice sequence E obeying 
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for if &m, n) is defined, for all m < lh u = k and all II, so that (6) holds, one may 
obtain (6) for a-0 and a-1 by letting 
i 
B&7 if I= mi #ml+, 
f(k 1) = 
L&, v B,,.,, if I = mi = ml-_i, 
oo - (B,:~., v B,,,), ifI=mO+ml+l, 
0, otherwise, 
where mi is the last entry in no-i. Since Be = B,, G U, Btg s II3.x R( &x)) 11, and so 
Lemmas 2 and 4 imply that 
T” E II~(&Wl 
for some m. Choose o E <“2, with n = lh u 2 m, so that 
&;= &:s II~&~))ll. 
(6) implies that 
J&g< IIWt(~))ll h ,o, II&k) = ((ncr)‘)Al; 
so by using the axioms and rules already verified in the model, one finds that 
B,;s IIWb 1 m)‘)ll. 
Because n = lh n, 5 m and 
Kg 6 IW (R(x) -+V~R(X*~~+‘)) & (R(x)+A(x))ll, 
Btgs IIA((no)‘)jl. By Lemma 2, therefore, 
TOe IIN(no)‘)ll, 
contrary to (4). So if one can find suitable collections {T”}oc<W2 and {~~}Os~~uz, 
one reaches a contradiction showing that BIM holds in the model. 
By (5), T0 = T, and by (3), n0 = 0. The only other nontrivial condition for CT = 0 
is (4), which holds by hypothesis. 
Given T” and n, obeying (l)-(5), one obtains the ToAi’s and 12,~;s as follows. 
Because 
B,; A IIVY A(h)’ *2’“)ll 
G IlVx [Vy A(x * 2y+1) *A(x) A IIVY A(b)’ *2’“)11 
s IIN(~~)‘)ll> 
(4) and Lemma 2 imply that T”$ llVyA((nO)’ *2y”)ll. Lemma 6 thus provides 
trees T@‘j, with tz”‘= t&, and natural numbers mi for which 
TO-’ 4 IIA((no)’ * 2”i+‘)jl. 
Letting fl,; = n,mi, one obtains new trees and sequences meeting (l)-(5), as 
desired. 
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WC-N also has an indirect verification. If 
U= IlVa 3xA(a; x)ll + IV@ 3x9 Y VP (&i(y) = &y)+A(B, x))ll, 
then 
u + II% Y VP (t(y) = $(Y)-+A(B, x))ll 
for some choice sequence 5. Lemma 2 implies that some tree T belongs to U but 
not to II% Y VP (S(Y) = &y)+A(B, x>)ll; b ecause U is open, one may assume 
that U contains T. If 
o = (mo, . . . , m&J E ‘2, 
let 
u* = (1, mo, 1, 1721, . . . , 1, mi_1) E CU)2, 
and let T’ be the tree given by 
t; = t,. 
for o E ‘“2. If for every k 
Bk = V { Bto_,+,_, : lh o = k and 16 k} 
(o’+’ is a sequence of I + 1 zeros), then each Bk is a complemented member of 
S(Oo) and Bk A Bkr = 0 if k # k’. Suppose that one can obtain a sequence 
Yo, Yl, . . . of choice sequences uch that 
(1) yk(r, s) A Bk = g(r, s) A Bk if r < k. 
(2) If lh o = k and I < k, then there is a tree T’,, contained in Bto._d+I_l, such 
that T!, 4 IIN% iNI. 
For any r and s let 
Because the Bk’s are complemented elements of S(ww), y : o x w+ S(@‘o); and 
a simpler version of Lemma 7’s computation shows that y is a choice sequence. 
Thus U s )13x A(j, x) 11. Since T is contained in U and tt, = tg, T’ is contained 
in U. So by Lemmas 2 and 4, T’ E /A(?, i)(( for some 1. Choose o E ‘“2 of 
length k 2 1 so that 
B,. = Bt; s IMP, hll. 
For all r and s, 
Bk A y(r, s) = Bk A ((i&h A y&t s)) ” [(-w - lrBm) A &r, s)]} 
= (ArB, A Bm A Ym(r, s)) 
mm- v B”> A &, d] ; 
m==r 
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since the B,‘s are pairwise disjoint, 
& A y(r, s) = 
Bk A yk(r, s) if k 6 r, 
Bk A g(r, s) if r < k; 
by condition (l), therefore, 
Bk A Y@, s> = B/c A y/c@, s). 
Thus Bk s 119 = pkll, and one may use the axioms and rules already verified to 
conclude that 
&++I-, s B,. A & 6 IIA(P, bll A ll? = ?kikll s IIA(j’k, &I- 
Because T’, is contained in Bto.++,_,, Lemma 2 implies that 
TI,E IIA(% &I, 
contrary to condition (2). This contradiction shows that WC-N holds in the model 
if one can find yk’s meeting (1) and (2). 
When k = 0, condition (1) becomes trivial, while condition (2) demands that 
one find a tree Tz, contained in Btol, that does not belong to IIA(po, O)ll. Since 
T $ II3x, y V/3 (g(y) = B(y)*A(& x))ll, Lemma 4 implies that 
T 4 IV@ &O) = i@‘P-+A(B, O))II = IlVSA(B, Wll. 
Lemma 6 thus provides a tree Tz and a choice sequence y. that satisfy condition 
(2). 
Suppose now that for some m 3 0, yo, . . . , y,,, obey (1) and (2)._One obtains a 
yM+r obeying these conditions as follows. Since T $ I(3x, y V/3 (c(y) = p(y)+ 
A@, x))ll, Lemma 4 implies that 
T 4 IIVP <&Cm + 1)‘) = I%@ + l)‘)-+NB, h)ll 
for all 1 <rn + 1. If u E “+l2 and 1 s m + 1, Lemma 6 provides a tree T’,, 
contained in Br,.++,_,, and a choice sequence yDsr such that 
T’,e II&k + 1)‘) = ?&Cm + ~)‘)+A(?,,I, bll. 
One may assume that 
(*) Qr, s) = y&r, s) if r C m + 1 
for all o E m+12 and I < m + 1: for one may otherwise define a choice sequence 
&,,I by 
and show that 
II&h + 1)‘) = &((m + l)‘)-+A(k,~, &I
s II&k + 1)‘) = f,,d(m + l)‘)+A(j,~, /)I!; 
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since T’, does not belong to the set on the right-hand side, T’, cannot belong to 
the set on the left-hand side, either. By Lemma 2 and the definition of 11 11, 
T’, $ IIA(Po,r, hII. 
To get a similar result for ym+l instead of the y O,l)s, one mixes them together by 
defining 
Ym+l(r, s) = [CWm - &?I+,) * Ym(r, s)l v Ih o=m+l ,sy+, u%d+‘-l * Yd(', s)) v 
for all r, s. Computations like those used in Lemma 7 show that ym+i is a choice 
sequence. If r < m + 1, then 
Ym+l(r, s) * &a+, = ,h v_ ,Gv+l Pb*-d+l-l * Y&9 s)) 
and so by (*) 
= EXr, s) * &,+I. 
Thus ym+i meets condition (1). As for condition (2) if (I E m+12 and 1 =Z m + 1, 
then ym+i’s definition implies that 
ym+d’, s) A 4,.-d+,-, = ~o,r(rt s) A &o.-c,+,-, 
for all r and s. So an easy computation shows that 
&.-d+,-, s Il?m+~ = ?a.,ll, 
and 
&o.-,,,+I-, A IlN?rn+~, iIll 6 IIL+I = ?,rll A llN?m+~, i)ll 
=s IIA(Po,r, bll 
by the axioms and rules already verified. Since Bt_,+,_, contains TL, which does 
not belong to IIA($J~,~, i)(l, T’,r# llA(j~,,,+~, i)ll by Lemma 2. Y,,,+~ therefore meets 
conditions (1) and (2) if y,,, does, and countable choice finishes the argument. 
To show, finally, that KS is true in the model, one may find a choice sequence 
5 for which 
IIA II = 113~ <&> f WI = y V, 56 4 
llAl1 is the union of a countable family {Si}i<o of clopen sets; if 
{ 
Oo - S, if m = 0, 
C(4 m) = & ifm=l, 
0 ifm>l 
for all I and m, 5 has the properties desired. 
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Having shown that every closed instance, in the expanded language, of an 
axiom of F is true in the model, and that F’s rules of inference preserve truth in 
the model, one may conclude that every closed instance of a theorem of F is true 
in the model. 
Conclusion 
In [lo] Krol builds from his model a realizability notion allowing him to prove 
the disjunction and existence properties for (F - {RDC}) U {“2.1}, and the proof 
presumably works for F as well. I have not yet found an analogue of Krol’s 
argument hat starts from the model of Section 2 instead. Van Dalen has invented 
a model-theoretic argument, using a ‘glueing operation’ [3], that yields the 
disjunction and existence properties for F if the argument is carried out in a 
model of F U Th(N) [4] (Z%(N) = classical first-order arithmetic). One may 
therefore establish these properties with the present model instead of with Krol’s. 
Yet a variant of his realizability notion allows him to show that KS is not provable 
from (F U (“2.1)) - {RDC, KS} together with all instances of 
3a [(3x ((u(x) #0)-A) & (Vx (a(x) = O)+lA)], 
where (Y is not free in A [ll]. To show that the present model is as useful as 
Krol’s, one should thus either adapt his realizability notions to the present model 
or use it in a new way to distinguish between the strong and weak forms of 
Kripke’s schema. 
Yet even if Krol’s model produces some results that the present model does 
not, its simpler truth definition may permit a more detailed study of its theory. 
Recent work on intuitionistic real algebra [19, 201 was inspired by the study of the 
theory of Scott’s model for the reals [15-181, and this theory is interpretable in 
the theory of Moschovakis’s model [13, pp. 273-41. If one can find a relatively 
simple structure related to the present model as Scott’s is related to 
Moschovakis’s, one may learn more about intuitionistic real algebra: for an 
example cited in the Introduction shows that the theory of Scott’s model is not 
always intuitionistically correct. The search for this structure should start with the 
representation theorem for R given in [5, pp. 282-41, but one would hope that 
special properties of S(“w) would simplify the structure presented there. 
To say that each model seems especially suited to certain investigations does 
not settle the exact relations between the models. One might try to compare them 
by studying the inverse image [6, p. 3731, under the obvious map from 0(“2) into 
S(“2) = S(“w), of Krol’s model, but I do not know how this new S(wo)-structure 
would compare with the model of Section 2. 
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